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Nevada Community Property Law
Annette R. Shermack*
A case unique in Nevada, and probably elsewhere, Anderson
v. McGill Club,' illustrates the substantive force of the com-
munity property concept. -There Gladys Anderson brought an
action against the defendant corporation which maintained a
gambling room. Her complaint alleged that for several months
the defendant had "knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and un-
lawfully in a spirit of recklessness, and from wanton and mali-
cious motives ' 2 procured, permitted and tempted divers persons,
including the husband of the plaintiff, Chet Anderson, "to fre-
quent said room and habitually engage in playing poker and
stud horse poker, from which games the defendant received a
share of the money played.' 3 It was further alleged that Chet
was of such nature he could not resist the temptation to gamble,
and being so tempted, and without Gladys' consent, he spent
many hours apart from her engaged in gambling and losing por-
tions of his salary as a clerk, the only source of income for him-
self, his wife and children. For her suffering, the loss of her
husband's companionship and the money upon which she relied
for support, Gladys sought $5,000 damages.
The lower court held the complaint did not state a cause of
action, and this decision was affirmed, the majority of the court
taking the view the complaint was defective in that Gladys did
not allege the defendant knew her husband was a married man,
or make other allegation showing a direct and intentional inva-
sion of the marital relation existing between Gladys and Chet.
It is easy to sympathize with the author of the opinion for
the court, Chief Justice Sanders, who said:
"The complaint is a novelty, both in form and substance. No
appeal for redress by a wife for a like grievance has ever
found its way into court, and I am apprehensive that in
their just indignation against the nefarious nuisance main-
tained by the defendant and in their commendable zeal for
* Member, New Mexico Bar.
1. 51 Nev. 16, 266 Pac. 913 (1928).
2. Id. at 19, 266 Pac. at 913.
3. Ibid.
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the protection of the home and the innocent members of
the family my associates have been led to affirm a proposi-
tion of law which cannot be sustained. 4
While the complaint alleged some of the elements of both
loss of consortium and alienation of affection, the court felt it
could not be "pegged" as stating either of these actions, but
viewed it as one for the tort of intentional invasion of the
marital relation. Whatever the cause of action was, the signifi-
cance of the case lies in its indication of the very real and direct
interest a wife has in community property, the extent to which
the courts will go in the protection of that interest and the
great divergence of concepts in the philosophy of the civil law
from that of the common law.
This case also serves as overture to what might be termed
the "purity" of treatment of community property law in Nevada.
Nevada was originally part of the Utah Territory and pre-
vious to statehood its law of marital ownership was that of the
Spanish and Mexican community property system. The consti-
tution of 1848 recognized the existence of community property
and directed that laws be enacted defining the rights of the
wife in both separate and community property. 5 The adoption
of common law as the rule of practice and procedure in 18616
was thought to govern property rights between husband and
wife prior to the first statutory definition of community property
in 1864," in some of the early cases;8 however, the denial of con-
tinuity of community property law in these cases is of only
academic interest today, as the statutes of 1864 adopted com-
munity of property almost as it was 'administered in Mexico.,
The statutes of 1864 were modeled after those existing in Cali-
4. Id. at 20, 266 Pac. at 913.
5. NEV. CONST. Art. IV, § 31 (1848): "All property, both real and personal,
of the wife owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired
afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be her separate property; and
laws shall be passed, more clearly defining the rights of the wife in relation,
as well to her separate property, as to that held in common with her hus-
band. Laws shall also be passed providing for the registration of the wife's
separate property."
6. Nev. Laws 1861, c. 1, p. 1.
7. Nev. Laws 1864-5, c. 76, p. 239.
8. Johnson v. Garner, 233 Fed. 756 (D.Nev. 1916); Winters v. Winters,
34 Nev. 323, 123 Pac. 17 (1912); Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 7 Pac. 74 (1884);
Darrenberger v. Haupt, 10 Nev. 43 (1875); 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY 112, § 52 (1943).
9. Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 Pac. 524 (1923).
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fornia.10 New legislation in 187311 superseded the act of 1864,
and with changes and amendments remains the law today. 1
2
Community property is defined as all property acquired
after marriage by husband or wife or both, except such property
as comes within the definition of separate property.' 3 Separate
property of the spouses is that owned by him or her prior to
marriage, or acquired thereafter by gift, bequest, devise or
descent, together with the rents, issues and profits therefrom. 4
The husband has the entire management and control of the
community property, both real and personal, and may dispose
of it as absolutely as he would his separate estate, subject to the
exception that any conveyance of the homestead must be joined
in execution and acknowledgment by both husband and wife.',
This exception has been held to refer to the homestead "in
fact.""' However, the wife may be constituted agent for the hus-
band and he will be bound by her contracts of purchase if such
agency can be established either by a showing of actual authori-
zation, or of ostensible agency by course of conduct.17 The gen-
eral principles of agency apply.'8 The wife is given control of
her earnings and accumulations and those of her minor children
living with her, when such earnings and accumulations are used
for the care and maintenance of the family.' 9 It is provided
where the husband has allowed the wife to appropriate her
earnings to her own use, such earnings, together with their rents
and profits, are deemed given to the wife by the husband and
are her separate property.20 The husband's power of manage-
ment of the community property includes the right to make gifts
of it to third persons without the consent of the wife where it
does not appear there was any fraudulent intent to defeat the
claims of the wife in such property and where the gift is reason-
able with reference to the value of the whole amount of com-
munity property.2 '
10. 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 112, § 52 (1943).
11. Nev. Laws 1873, c. 119, p. 193.
12. See NEv. ComP. LAWS (1929) (Supps. 1931-41 and 1943-9).
13. NEV. CoMP. LAWS § 3356 (1929).
14. Id. § 3355.
15. Id. § 3360.
16. First Nat. Bank of Ely v. Meyers, 39 Nev. 235, 150 Pac. 308 (1916).
17. Harrah v. Specialty Shops, 67 Nev. 493, 221 P.2d 398 (1950); Travers
v. Barrett, 30 Nev. 402, 97 Pac. 126 (1908).
18. Harrah v. Home Furniture, 67 Nev. 114, 214 P.2d 1016 (1950).
19. NEV. COMP. LAWS § 3360 (1929).
20. Id. § 3369; Goldsworthy v. Johnson, 45 Nev. 355, 204 Pac. 505 (1922).
21. Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 Pac. 524 (1923).
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Neither husband nor wife is liable for antenuptial debts of
the other2 2 and the husband is not liable for the wife's ante-
nuptial torts.2 3 The separate property of the wife is not liable
for the debts of her husband, but is liable for her own debts.24
But, the wife must support her husband out of her separate
property when he has no separate property, and when there is
no community property and the husband due to infirmity is
unable to support himself.25 Where a husband neglects to pro-
vide necessaries for his wife, any person may so provide them
and recover their value from the husband.26 The husband is not
liable for the wife's support if she has unjustifiedly abandoned
him. 27 The wife's interest in the community property is not
subject to attachment in an action against the wife on an alleged
guaranty contract.28
Husband and wife may hold property as "joint tenants, ten-
ants in common, or as community property," 29 and they are free
to make any contract with one another, or with any other per-
son, respecting property, as if they were unmarried, subject to
the general rules governing persons in relations of confidence and
trust.30 Except as limited by this right of contract, neither hus-
band nor wife has any interest in the separate property of the
other.31 Aside from the power given husbands and wives to
alter their relations as to property, they may not alter their
legal relations by agreement,32 except that they may enter into
separation agreements and may provide for the support of either
of them and of their children during separation. 83 If a divorce
is contemplated by the parties, they may provide that such
agreement is made for the purpose of removing the subject mat-
ter from the field of litigation and that the agreement shall be-
22. NEV. CoMp. LAWS § 3371.01 (Supp. 1931-41).
23. Slack v. Schwartz, 63 Nev. 47, 161 P.2d 345 (1945).
24. NEV. CoMP. LAWS § 3371 (1929).
25. Id. § 3378.
26. Id. § 3376.
27. Id. § 3377. Apparently no cases have arisen under this section and
it is subject to conjecture whether this provision makes any change in the
character of the husband's earnings and acquisitions during such period of
unjustified abandonment. However, as the courts' powers over division of
both community and separate property upon divorce are very broad, NEv.
CoMP. LAWS § 9463 (Supp. 1931-41), the question could arise only in unusual
instances.
28. Peterson v. Wiesner, 62 Nev. 184, 146 P.2d 789 (1944).
29. NEv. CoMP. LAWS § 3362 (1929).
30. Id. § 3373.
31. Id. § 3372. But see NEv. CoMP. LAWS § 9463 (Supp. 1931-41).
32. NE:v. COMP. LAWS § 3374 (1929).
33. Ibid.
[VOL. XV
1955] NEVADA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 563
come effective only in event a divorce is granted.3 4 The mutual
consent of the parties is sufficient consideration for such agree-
ment.
8 5
Husband and wife are free to enter into marriage contracts
or settlements.3 6 Property rights shall be governed by the
community property law unless a marriage contract or settle-
ment contains contrary stipulations.3 7 Such contracts must be
executed in writing with the formalities required for convey-
ances of land, and when recorded in any county wherein real
estate affected is located, they constitute full notice of their
contents. 38 Unless so recorded, marriage contracts or settlements
are valid only as between the parties.3 9 A minor capable of con-
tracting marriage may make a valid marriage contract or
settlement.'
The wife is given complete power over her separate prop-
erty.41 She may convey, charge, encumber, or in any manner
dispose of it.
Where a wife suffers personal injuries due to the negligence
of another, suit may be brought by the husband and wife jointly
or separately at their option. When they sue jointly, the dam-
ages must be segregated; the damages assessed by reason of
personal injuries and pain and suffering are awarded to and
belong to the wife, while damages assessed for loss of services,
hospital and medical expense and other care are awarded to the
husband. Where the wife sues separately, all damages sustained
by her are awarded to and belong to her. 42
Upon divorce, it is provided the court shall make such dis-
position of the community and separate property as shall appear
just and equitable, giving consideration to the respective merits
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the
divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired,
34. Ibid.
35. Id. § 3375.
36. Id. § 3380.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. § § 3381, 3382, 3383.
39. Id. § 3384.
40. Id. § 3385.
41. Id. § 3363.
42. NEv. COMP. LAws § 3389.01 (Supp. 1943-9). This section passed in
1949 incorporated in the statutes the previous holding in Fredrickson &
Watson Const. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940), with added pro-
vision it is optional for husband and wife to sue jointly or separately. See
also Underhill v. Anciaux, 68 Nev. 69, 226 P.2d 794 (1951).
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and the burdens, if any, imposed upon it for the benefit of the
children.13
Upon the death of the wife, the entire community property
vests without administration in the surviving husband, except
for the case where the husband has abandoned the wife without
such cause as would entitle him to a divorce, when the wife's
half of the community property, subject to the payment of the
equal proportion of community debts, is subject to her testa-
mentary disposition in the same manner as her separate prop-
erty.44
Upon the husband's death, one-half of the community prop-
erty vests in the surviving wife and the other half is subject to
testamentary disposition by the husband. If he dies intestate,
the property goes equally to his surviving wife and children; if
there are no children, the entire community estate goes to the
wife, subject to the payment of debts. 45 It is also required that
the homestead and other property exempt from execution be
set apart for the use of the widow and minor heirs, if any.46
Even though a homestead has not been declared during the life
of the decedent, the court must set aside a homestead in com-
munity property on the widow's request. 47
Estates in dower and curtesy are abolished. 48
Nevada law incorporates provision for the filing of an in-
ventory of the separate property of the wife. 49 Unfortunately,
no information is available as to the frequency of use of the
inventory. However, as will be noted hereafter, the presence or
43. NEV. CoMP. LAWS § 9463 (Supp. 1931-41) expressly amending NEV.
CoMP. LAWS § 3366 (1929). The earlier section provided the community prop-
erty must be equally divided between the parties except that where the
decree of divorce was rendered on the ground of adultery or extreme cruelty,
the guilty spouse should only be entitled to such portion of the community
property as the court in its discretion might deem just to allow. See John-
son v. Garner, 233 Fed. 756 (D.Nev. 1916), for discussion of a conflicting
statute adopted in 1861, NEV. COMP. LAWS § 9465 (1929), and amended in Nev.
Laws 1939, c. 25, § 2, p. 18.
44. NEv. CoMP. LAWS § 3395.01 (Supp. 1931-41).
45. Id. § 3395.02.
46. Ibid. In Nevada a homestead of the value of $10,000 may be de-
clared, and after filing such declaration husband and wife shall be deemed
to hold the homestead as joint tenants. Nsv. CoMP. LAWS § 3315 (Supp.
1943-9). See In re Cook's Estate, 34 Nev. 217, 117 Pac. 27 (1911), for discus-
sion of homestead on separate property.
47. In re Cook's Estate, 34 Nev. 217, 117 Pac. 27 (1911).
48. NEV. CoMP. LAWS § 3361 (1929).
49. Id. § 3357. Id. §§ 3358, 3359, provide for the filing of inventory for
record to serve as notice of the wife's title to the property and the effect of
failure to so file.
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absence of inventory has considerable probative value in estab-
lishing the character of property as the separate property of
the wife or as community property.5°
Nevada has no statutory presumptions respecting the char-
acter of ownership of property as community or separate accord-
ing to the manner in which title is taken by one or the other or
both of the spouses.5 1
Under the general statutory framework outlined above,
Nevada's courts have been called upon chiefly to interpret the
definitions of community and separate property with reference
to initial acquisition and transmutation from one form of owner-
ship to another, and to declare the rights of husband and wife
under contracts executed between them, both as to the character
of the property in transactions involving creditors and between
the parties upon divorce.
Another, and a most enlightened, segment of Nevada law
concerns its holding as to the character of ownership of com-
pensation awarded for injuries sustained by the spouses due to
the negligence of third parties and the allied problem of imputing
the negligence of one spouse to the other.
The following paragraphs are intended to give only a very
general summary of the principles of Nevada law with reference
to these matters.
The courts of Nevada never experimented with the idea that
the wife's interest in the community property is only a mere
expectancy, but from the beginning viewed it as a present,
vested interest.52 In a very early case the husband's interest in
the community property was described as a moiety.53 In a later
case where it was urged that the wife's interest in the community
was subject to the payment of an inheritance tax upon the death
of her husband, the much criticized distinction between the
terms "goes to" and "belongs to" which appear in the earlier
50. See Petition of Fuller, 63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579 (1945), where it is
held failure to file inventory is a circumstance to be considered on question
of proof of character of ownership. To the same effect is Thomas v. Nevans,
67 Nev. 122, 215 P.2d 244 (1950).
51. Such provisions are present in New Mexico and California: N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 65-401 (Supp. 1953); CAL. CIV. CODE § 164 (Deering, 1949). See
Clark, Presumptions in New Mexico Community Property Law: The Cali-
fornia Influence, 25 So. CALIF. L. REV. 149 (1952).
52. 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF .COMMUNITY PROPERTY 312, § 110 (1943).
53. Crow v. Van Sickle, 6 Nev. 146 (1870).
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Nevada statutes5 4 in describing the interest of the wife and hus-
band respectively in the community property upon the death of
the other spouse, utilized to urge a difference in the character of
their ownership, was flatly rejected and it was held the wife's
interest in the community did not pass to her under the laws of
inheritance.55
Parallel in importance with the recognition of the wife's
vested interest in community property is the general presump-
tion recognized in Nevada, as it is believed under all community
property systems, that property acquired after marriage by
husband and wife is community property,"6 unless the time and
manner of its acquisition establish it as separate property of
one or the other of the spouses under the statutory definition. 7
If property, or an equitable interest in it, is acquired before
marriage, it is presumed to be separate property.58 In each in-
stance these presumptions may be rebutted by a showing of
clear and convincing evidence in proof of the contrary.
The general test of whether property is community or
separate is whether it was purchased with or acquired in ex-
change for community or separate funds or property. 9 The
character of ownership does not depend on who may have recoi'd
title to the property, or, indeed, upon how the parties regard it
as being held, but upon the circumstances of its acquisition, and
the character of ownership is determined as of such timeY°
A husband may make a valid gift of community funds or
property to his wife to be held as her separate property,61 but
54. In re Williams' Estate, 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741, L.R.A. 1917C 602
(1916); NEv. REv. LAWS §§ 2164, 2165 (1912). California formerly had the
same provision, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1401, 1402, prior to amendment, 1923; and
such is the present provision in New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-108,
31-109 (1941).
55. In re Williams' Estate, 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741 (1916).
56. In re Wilson's Estate, 56 Nev. 353, 53 P.2d 339 (1936); Lake v. Bender,
18 Nev. 361, 7 Pac. 74 (1884).
57. NEv. CoMP. LAWS § 3355 (1929); Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208
Pac. 435 (1922).
58. In re Wilson's Estate, 56 Nev. 353, 53 P.2d 339 (1936); Barrett v.
Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 Pac. 435 (1922); Laws v. Ross, 44 Nev. 405, 194 Pac.
465 (1921); Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 7 Pac. 74 (1884).
59. Petition of Fuller, 63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579 (1945); In re Wilson's Es-
tate, 56 Nev. 353, 53 P.2d 339 (1936); Malmstrom v. People's Drain Ditch
Co., 32 Nev. 246, 107 Pac. 98 (1910).
60. In re Wilson's Estate, 56 Nev. 353, 53 P.2d 339 (1936); Hill v. Du Pratt,
51 Nev. 242, 274 Pac. 2 (1929); Milisich v. Hillhouse, 48 Nev. 166, 228 Pac.
307 (1924); Barrett v. Franke, 46 Nev. 170, 208 Pac. 435 (1922). See Edmonds
v. Perry, 62 Nev. 41, 140 P.2d 566 (1943), for interesting related joint bank
account case.
61. Petition of Fuller, 63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579 (1945); Stockgrowers &
Ranchers Bank of Reno v. Milisich, 52 Nev. 178, 283 Pac. 913 (1930).
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proof to establish such gift must be clear and convincing. Ordi-
narily a mere verbal assertion of gift, or the recording of a con-
veyance in the wife's name is insufficient to establish a gift
where the property was acquired with community funds. 2
Nevertheless, it should be noted that at least one Nevada case
unequivocally invokes the presumption of gift to the wife where
property has been transferred or conveyed to her by her hus-
band. 5 This case asserted that the presumption could be over-
come only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
saying this meant more than a preponderance of the evidence,
as if the evidence were in conflict the presumption would pre-
vail. The authorities relied upon in this case are from common
law jurisdictions and it is submitted that this presumption of
gift is not logically a strong one, as its substantive basis, that is,
a limited interest of the wife in marital gains, is not present in
Nevada.64 It is also doubtful if the presumption has any force
in actions where creditors or other third parties are involved.
With respect to the character of particular acquisitions, it
has been held that the earnings of either the husband or the
wife are community property. 5 Compensation for injuries to
the person arising from violation of the right of personal secur-
ity is not community property, but separate; the character of a
judgment obtained by one spouse as separate or community
property depends on the right violated. 6 Thus, where the wife
sustains injuries as the result of negligence of third parties, her
physical pain and suffering are not the loss of the husband or
the community, but are a loss personal to the wife, and contribu-
tory negligence of the husband may not be imputed to the wife
62. In re Condos' Estate, 266 P.2d 404 (Nev. 1954); Petition of Fuller,
63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579 (1945); In re Wilson's Estate, 56 Nev. 353, 53 P.2d
339 (1936); Milisich v. Hillhouse, 48 Nev. 166, 228 Pac. 307 (1924).
63. Peardon v. Peardon, 65 Nev. 717, 201 P.2d 309 (1948).
64. See discussion of the case of Lombardi v. Lombardi, 44 Nev. 314, 195
Pac. 93 (1921), in 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 190, § 73
(1943), adverse to the holding that when either community or separate funds
are devoted by the husband to the improvement of the wife's separate prop-
erty, the title to the property is not changed, but as between the spouses,
in the absence of an agreement, the husband is presumed to have intended
a gift to the wife. The burden of the criticism is there is no reason to pre-
sume a gift. In any case, it is submitted such rule is certainly at logger-
heads with the rule of Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 7 Pac. 74 (1884), and
Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355 (1950), to the effect the
community owns so much of the increase from separate property as is due
to the labor or management of the spouses.
65. Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355 (1950); Jones v.
Edwards, 49 Nev. 299, 245 Pac. 292 (1926). See, however, NEv. COMp. LAWS
§ 3369 (1929); Goldsworthy v. Johnson, 45 Nev. 355, 204 Pac. 505 (1922).
66. Fredrickson & Watson Const. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627
(1940).
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to defeat her recovery.6 7 Similarly, the proceeds from a mother's
exercise of her statutory right to maintain an action for the
death of a minor adopted child are not community property,
and the contributory negligence of the father cannot be imputed
to the mother to defeat recovery.68 The increase, fruits and
profits from separate property remain separate property where
the additional acquisition comes mainly from the property itself;
but where such acquisitions are due mainly to the efforts or
skill of the parties, they are community property.69
It has been seen that in Nevada husband and wife have great
latitude to determine their relations as to their property by con-
tract. The extent to which they may do so is seen in the recent
case of Woods v. Bromley,7 where a separation agreement re-
cited that the husband and wife held certain property as joint
tenants and they agreed that it was their intent to thereby vest
title in themselves as tenants in common. It was held the con-
tract itself vested title in them in common as opposed to the
contention of the wife that such change could be accomplished
only by formal conveyances as the contract contained a provision
that such would be executed. The decision was based upon the
fact that the agreement clearly disclosed the intention of the
parties to execute an immediate severance of the unities of joint
tenancy and create tenancy in common.
Due to the relation of husband and wife as one of "confi-
dence and trust,"71 the rules respecting fiduciaries apply to them
with regard to constructive fraud and Nevada has held that the
law implies one of the parties has a superiority over the other
and a contract between them is to the advantage of the one
presumptively superior-the husband.72 Upon the husband, then,
is cast the burden of overcoming such presumption by showing
compliance with the equitable requisites of good faith, full
knowledge, independent consent and action.7 3 Yet it has been
recognized that the wife may in fact be the superior spouse, as
under statutes emancipating women the relationship of super-
iority is easily interchangeable.7 4
67. Ibid.
68. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R. v. Umbaugh, 61 Nev. 214, 123 P.2d 224 (1942).
69. Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355 (1950); Lake v.
Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 7 Pac. 74 (1884).
70. 241 P.2d 1103 (Nev. 1952).
71. NEv. CoMP. LAWS § 3373 (1929).
72. Crawford v. Crawford, 24 Nev. 410, 56 Pac. 94 (1899).
73. Ibid.
74. Peardon v. Peardon, 65 Nev. 717, 201 P.2d 309 (1948).
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The most frequent examples of litigation regarding contracts
between the spouses occur in divorce cases. When property set-
tlements are incorporated in a divorce decree they are to be
construed fairly and reasonably, not too strictly or technically.1 5
Before a property settlement incorporated in a divorce decree
may be set aside on the ground of fraud, the fraud must be
established as extrinsic, 76 that is, such fraud as prevents a party
from having his day in court.
Reference has already been made to the wide discretionary
powers of the courts in Nevada in respect to the division of
property upon divorce.7 7 However, if property rights are not in
issue in a divorce action and the decree is limited to dissolution
of the marriage, rights of the spouses in the property are not
prejudiced thereby, but each party may thereafter enforce
them in a separate action for such purpose.78 Each spouse's for-
mer separate property remains his or her individual property,
and former community property is held by the parties as tenants
in common in such case. 79 It has been held the Nevada courts
have power in divorce actions where the parties are within the
jurisdiction of the court to pass indirectly upon title to land
located in another state, though it is recognized the judgment
is effective only in personam80
In conclusion it is submitted Nevada has been singularly
fortunate in avoiding some of the perplexing and troublesome
75. Murphy v. Murphy, 64 Nev. 440, 183 P.2d 632 (1947).
76. Mazour v. Mazour, 64 Nev. 245, 180 P.2d 103 (1947); Calvert v. Calvert,
61 Nev. 168, 122 P.2d 426 (1942).
77. See, generally, Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355
(1950); Herzog v. Herzog, 249 P.2d 533 (Nev. 1952); Cunningham v. Cun-
ningham, 61 Nev. 93, 116 P.2d 188 (1941); Walker v. Walker, 41 Nev. 4, 164
Pac. 653 (1917). The last cited case involves an unusual marriage settlement
agreement and is exemplary of the powers of the Nevada courts upon divorce
in division of property.
78. First Nat. Bank of Nevada v. Wolff, 66 Nev. 51, 202 P.2d 878 (1949).
79. First Nat. Bank of Nevada v. Wolff, 66 Nev. 51, 202 P.2d 878 (1949)
overruled sub silentio the earlier holding in Keenan v. Keenan, 40 Nev. 351,
164 Pac. 351 (1917), where it was ruled a wife who had left her residence in
Nevada and secured a divorce elsewhere, then returned to Nevada and in
a separate action for such purpose tried to assert her rights in the former
community property of the spouses, could not do so, the court basing its
decision on the language of NEv. CoMP. LAWS § 3366 (1929), and declaring
only the court on divorce had power to divide community property. In this
connection, however, probably only the court granting the divorce would
have jurisdiction to divide the property of either spouse or the community
according to the merits of the issue and the circumstances of the parties as
provided in NEV. CoMP. LAWS § 9463 (1929), as amended, Nev. Laws 1939, c.
25, § 1, p. 18. Therefore, if such issue were not litigated, in the divorce
action, it is questionable if action could thereafter be brought for more than
equal division of the community and for separate property.
80. Buaas v. Buass (sic), 62 Nev. 232, 147 P.2d 495 "(1944).
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rules adopted in other community property jurisdictions.
(1) Nevada from the beginning saw the wife's interest in com-
munity property as a present, vested interest. (2) The power of
the spouses to transmute their holdings from community to sep-
arate property and vice versa has never been questioned.
(3) Without the aid of statute, Nevada determined that the pro-
ceeds of a judgment for personal injury to one of the spouses for
pain and suffering or other personal loss is the separate prop-
erty of such spouse, and such right to compensation cannot be
defeated by the imputation of negligence of the other spouse.
It is believed that Nevada has been able to steer such a clear
course by virtue of the fact her courts have generally resorted
to the fundamental civil law concept of community property
and have not been misled by too great a concern for what other
community property states have held. Many of the decisions of
this state stand as fine examples of the way in which community
property principles may be applied in the just and equitable
solution of modern problems.
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